the dungeon has...

Wittgenstein on following a rule

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of what it is to follow a rule has attracted a lot of attention. The majority of his discussion can be found in his Philosophical Investigations (PI) passages 138-242 and his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM) Section VI, where he explores the idea that what gives a word its meaning is a rule for its use. His text is often difficult to understand, partly due to the nature of his discussion which led to the use of an indirect writing style: ‘His writing is complex and shifting because its target is complex and shifting.’[i] This ‘complex and shifting’ argument has led to disagreement about what exactly Wittgenstein’s view was about rule following.

One of the most widely debated assessments of Wittgenstein’s views has been given by Saul Kripke, in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. His discussion of rule following is commonly suggested to have misrepresented Wittgenstein’s actual beliefs on this topic. For example, Baker and Hacker have commented: ‘in the course of his reflections Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein a variety of views which he never held, and imposes upon his writings a variety of interpretations for which there is no license.’[ii] Even Kripke was unsure how much his account actually represented Wittgenstein’s views: ‘the present paper should be thought of as expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument nor ‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him.’[iii] Therefore, Kripke, whilst discussing Wittgenstein, shall be referred to as Kripkenstein for clarification.

This paper shall attempt to summarise Kripke’s discussion, consider the extent that his views can be argued to differ from those of Wittgenstein, and present an alternative reading of the text that can be made with consideration to Wittgenstein’s overall philosophical views. An analysis shall not be made of the strengths or weaknesses of Kripke’s commentary in its own right.

Kripkenstein discusses the potential of a sceptical paradox which would show ‘all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible.’[iv] He suggests that this sceptical paradox is referred to in PI 201. ‘This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.’[v] He considers a radical sceptic who, referring to the rule of addition, claims that there is nothing in my past usage of ‘+’ that can be used to justify the answer that I should give in any present or future circumstances.

The point is that there is nothing in my past usage that determines how I should apply the rule in future cases. Kripkenstein suggests that since I have only used the function ‘+’ on a limited number of occasions I cannot be sure that the rule being followed is ‘plus’ as opposed to ‘quus’. The definition of ‘quus’ is ‘x Å y = x + y, if x, y < 57; otherwise, x Å y = 5’ where the function ‘quus’ is indicated by the symbol Å. If I have only performed additions of numbers less that 57 then both ‘plus’ and ‘quus’ yield the same answer. Kripkenstein asks: ‘Who is to say that [quus] is not the function I previously meant by '+'?’[vi] He suggests from this that ‘if it is false, there must be some fact about my past usage that can be cited to refute it. For although the hypothesis is wild, it does not seem to be a priori impossible.’[vii] The challenge is to provide a fact about previous mental, behavioural, or physical history, which can be seen to constitute meaning plus rather than quus. The claim is that no one can justify such an assertion because there is no such fact that shows they intended one as opposed to another. Even granted perfect recall and access to past memories and past behaviour, no such fact seems apparent. In addition, if there can be no fact about which function I meant in the past then there can be no fact about which function I mean in the present. The failure to provide such a fact leads the sceptic to conclude that there are no facts-of-the-matter concerning meaning.

Kripkenstein is particularly concerned with arguing against dispositionalist accounts of meaning. A dispositionalist account of meaning claims that understanding consists of having an appropriate set of dispositions to behave, where behave in this context is to use a word in certain ways in certain contexts. However, Kripkenstein considers that this account does not explain the normativeness of our language use; a dispositionalist account may tell us what we will do under certain circumstances, but not what we ought to do. If you are using a word according to its meaning then there is a way that it ought to be used if you want to apply it correctly. Kripkenstein’s sceptic requires a fact that ‘must, in some sense, show how I am justified in giving the answer '125' to '68 + 57.’[viii] He is demanding a fact that will determine both what the subject means and what he ought to do on each occasion.

Kripkenstein argues that the dispositionalist account equates correctness with performance. He suggests that the dispositionalist is reliant on the following assumption: ‘when a subject is asked what 68+57 is he will respond 125’. However, such dispositions will only ever be tested in finitely many conditions whereas the possibilities of addition are infinite. In addition the subject may be disposed to make mistakes, or have difficulty in performing very large sums. The dispositionalist account can be seen to make no room for the notion of a mistaken application of the rule, since according to that account to understand the rule is to possess just that disposition.

Kripkenstein argues that any responses the dispositionalist could make will also fail:

…if the dispositionalist attempts to define which function I meant as the function determined by the answer I am disposed to give for arbitrarily large arguments, he ignores the fact that my dispositions extend to only finitely many cases. If he tries to appeal to my responses under idealized conditions that overcome this finiteness, he will succeed only if the idealization includes a specification that I will still respond, under these idealized conditions, according to the infinite table of the function I actually meant. But then the circularity of the procedure is evident. The idealized dispositions are determinate only because it is already settled which function I meant.[ix]

Since we can never experience all the possible cases where a word may be applied, and since such accounts necessitate the use of a ceteris paribus clause, no account of dispositions to behave under idealised circumstances can be made.

Another possible response to the sceptic is that we refer to our environment in order to justify our terms; such a referral would act as a regulator on our meaning. Kripkenstein has a response to such a move. One example he gives is that of ‘counting’:

Thus the sceptic can question my present interpretation of my past usage of ‘count’ as he did with ‘plus’. In particular, he can claim that by ‘count’ I formerly meant quount, where to ‘quount’ a heap is to count it in the ordinary sense, unless the heap was formed as the union of two heaps, one of which has 57 or more items, in which case one must automatically give the answer ‘5’.[x]

A further response to the sceptic would be an appeal to the community, where specific use could be measured against the usage of the community as a whole. We could say that a speaker attaches the correct meaning to a word if their use of it appears to coincide with the way the majority of people in their linguistic community use it. If there is a community-wide pattern of use for a word or a rule then the individual will be using it correctly if the use they make coincides with this pattern. However, on this approach the community cannot itself go right or wrong since it is its own standard of correctness. As Simon Blackburn comments: ‘An individual player in the orchestra may go wrong. But how can the orchestra itself do so? There seems to be no external standard by which it can be deemed to be doing well or badly.’[xi] It can also be argued that individuals are not really guided by the community, in so far as their use simply coincides or not with the rest of the community.

A. J. Ayer summarises the sceptical conclusion as follows:

…the conclusion which Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein is that nothing in the subject’s mental history or his past behaviour determines, in advance of his actually doing the sum, which rule he will follow; and this is taken to imply that so far as the subject’s intentions were concerned there is… no fact of the matter either.[xii]

Kripkenstein does not want to dispense with meaning altogether, and so he offers a sceptical solution. A normal, or ‘straight’, solution would be to disprove the sceptic by showing one of his premises to be unfounded or flawed. A ‘sceptical solution’, in contrast, accepts the problem raised by the sceptic and then offers a solution to the issue. In this case he maintains that although there are no facts that determine how my words should be used, I will go on using them and being subject to correction by them.

According to Kripkenstein this is done by moving from truth-conditional accounts of meaning (such as the view espoused by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) to an account of meaning based on justification-conditions. The solution is thereby sceptical because it asserts that any appeal to mental states, or behaviour, or environment, to justify our language use will not work. The solution Kripkenstein gives is that the justification of any single person’s language use is given by appeal to the linguistic community of which he is a part. For example:

The customer, when he deals with the grocer and asks for five apples, expects the grocer to count as he does, not according to some bizarre non-standard rule; and so, if his dealings with the grocer involve a computation, such as ‘68+57’, he expects the grocer’s responses to agree with his own.[xiii]

Our socio-linguistic practices within our community commit us to behaving in standardised ways. Such an account avoids the claim that we use ‘+’ in a certain way because of some hidden fact of either mental or behavioural origin and instead appeals to community practices. Kripkenstein attempted to show that all language would appear to be unintelligible under a truth-conditional account, and so the ‘sceptical solution’ leads us to the conclusion that we cannot ‘speak of a single individual, considered by himself and in isolation, as ever meaning anything.’[xiv] The distinction between being right and wrong is not made on the basis of facts in the world, according to Kripkenstein, because there are none. Instead if I am inclined to give the answer 125 to the question posed by the sceptic, and the rest of my community is inclined the same way, then I am right. One consequence of this is that it would not be possible to follow a rule in isolation from a community. Kripkenstein therefore argues that these passages in the PI provide the main part of Wittgenstein’s argument against private language.

In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of Wittgenstein’s views, in comparison, his overall approach needs to be considered. His first book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus presented a logical atomist picture of reality and its relation to language. At this point he considered that there are simple objects that are named by the basic elements of language. He thought that an elementary sentence is a combination of names, which connect with the simple objects in the world. Furthermore ‘the rules for the correct use of a word are in some way determined by the nature of the object denoted by that word.’[xv] He considered language to be a fixed and in some sense timeless framework, possessing an almost crystalline structure.

Wittgenstein’s view changed, however, as he came to realise that language is an aspect of changeable human life, and that his idea that words named simple objects was incoherent. He replaced it with the concept of ‘language-games’. He points out that different words function in different ways. In order to teach language you need to train a person to produce and understand words in the everyday activities of life; such as carrying out orders, shopping, singing etc. Marie McGinn suggests: ‘… learning our language... [is] coming to participate in a vast network of structured activities that essentially employ language.’[xvi] He came to the conclusion that ‘For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word ‘‘meaning’’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.’[xvii] It is interesting to note here that Wittgenstein is suggesting that the meaning of a word is not always its use in language.

If the meaning of a word were its use in the language, would this use be given in accord with a rule of correct use? In Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Grammar he commented: ’When we study language we envisage it as a game with fixed rules. We compare it with, and measure it against, a game of that kind.’[xviii] The appeal to rules could be seen to guarantee what range of things a word applies to, even in new cases, and can grant normative status. Competent speakers of a language are expected to use these rules; they determine how we ought to use a word.

However, if meaning is something that accompanies a rule, in this sense, then ‘whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.’[xix] This was Kripkenstein’s paradox. Wittgenstein discusses the case of a learner who is asked to continue the series 2, 4, 6, 8… To go from one number to the next they need to understand the rule for continuing the series. But, how do they learn this rule from only a finite set of examples. The justification for continuing the series is dependant upon their rule being the same as that of their instructor. However there are infinitely many different possible moves that they could make, and each move can be made out to accord with a different rule. In the example we are asked to presume that this pupil has mastered the rule, in this case +2, up to 1000. However, when asked to continue the series beyond 1000, he writes: 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012…

We say to him: "Look what you've done!" - He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!" - He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it." - Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way." - It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see....?" - and repeat the old examples and explanations. - In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on."[xx]

In this case, how could we convey the rule? As Wittgenstein pointed out in Zettel: ‘I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules.’[xxi] Giving the student the same examples again will not help. We appear to be reliant on the fact that given the same examples people will naturally continue them in the same way. In this instance the pupil is not following our command, or rule, even though he thinks he is.

Wittgenstein questions the view that understanding is solely a matter of having a picture come before your mind. When I understand the word horse, for example, it does not help to say that the understanding, or mental picture I have, determines every possible use I may go on to make of it. So, understanding a word cannot consist in having a picture before one’s mind, because a picture cannot determine a words use or application. He wonders how what can come before our mind in a flash of understanding can actually ‘fit a use.’[xxii] He points out that if the meaning of a word is the use that is made of it but is also what comes before our mind ‘in a flash’[xxiii] there is the possibility for contradiction. His point is that meaning cannot be something that accompanies a word in the sense mentioned above even though ‘One is tempted to use the following picture: what he really ‘wanted to say’, what he ‘meant’ was already present somewhere in his mind even before we gave it expression.’[xxiv]

Since understanding a word has normative consequences, and no mental picture can tell us how it ought to be applied in various situations, having a mental image, or experience, cannot be sufficient for meaning something by a word. This is because a mental image or picture is itself a sign, in the same way as a word. If understanding a sign - in this case a word – consists in being explained with reference to another sign – in this case a mental picture – another sign would be needed to fix the meaning of this sign, leading to a vicious regress. If one sign is not enough for understanding, then a succession of signs cannot be. This is because the addition of a sign to give the meaning of another sign is an interpretation, and since no sign is self-interpreting, it would require interpretation by another sign, and so on. A mental picture does not determine, in itself, the use we go on to make of it. On this model we would need meaning to be the last sign, by being self-interpreting, but this is not coherent.

Wittgenstein has stated this point succinctly in his Blue and Brown Books: ‘Let us put it in this way:—What one wishes to say is: “Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.”’[xxv] This is not just true for ‘mental’ signs, but can also be applied to physical signs. Meaning therefore cannot be a sign, because it cannot be a matter of interpretation. Unlike Kripkenstein this does not lead Wittgenstein to a paradox of how we can mean anything, instead he suggests that ‘there is a way of following a rule which is not an interpretation.’[xxvi]

As has already been discussed Kripke based his commentary around one particular passage in the PI. Kripke felt that PI 201 summarised the paradox that Wittgenstein was commenting on. However many commentaries have noted that Kripke has failed to take into account a full reading of the text. The passage in full is as follows:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord not conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.[xxvii]

It is unfortunate that Kripke has failed to take note of the second paragraph here. Wittgenstein immediately follows his summary of the paradox, which is so important to Kripkenstein’s argument, with the line: ‘It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding.’ Wittgenstein appears to think that this paradox is the result of a misunderstanding. It is also interesting to note that Wittgenstein uses the past tense when referring to this paradox: ‘This was our paradox’ (my italics). This suggests that Wittgenstein feels that the paradox has already been resolved, and this would also seem to fit with the text. At PI 198 Wittgenstein had suggested this ‘paradox’ was a mistake: ‘That is not what we ought to say.’[xxviii] It can be interpreted then that the paradox is the result of a misunderstanding and that: ‘there is a way of following a rule which is not an interpretation’[xxix] which ‘a person goes by … only in so far as there exists … a custom.’[xxx]

In order to further develop his notion of rule following he discusses the way we view machines. This discussion can be found at PI 193: ‘the movement of the machine-as-symbol is predetermined in a different sense from that in which the movement of any given actual machine is predetermined.’[xxxi] In this passage he points out that we have two different notions of the operations of a machine; the machine as it is in the world and the machine-as-symbol. The movement of the machine-as-symbol is predetermined – because it has been designed to do a certain thing. For example, in the case of a photocopier, it will scan a piece of paper and print a copy when the button is pressed. That is what it will do. In reality, however, we accept that it is a physical machine and may not function the way that it was designed. Wittgenstein is concerned that we conflate these two different pictures of the operations of the machine. The actual photocopier may act in any old way when the copy button is pressed, but the machine-as-symbol will photocopy the paper. The movement of the actual machine is determined causally, by the movement of its physical parts, whereas the movement of the machine-as-symbol is pre-determined logically. This logical pre-determination is exactly the same as the way the applications of the rule are pre-determined by the rule, and tell us how we ought to behave.

If we confuse the machine-as-symbol with the actual machine we create the idea of a machine which will function in reality according to those rules, which therefore cannot malfunction or go wrong and is thereby logically guaranteed to follow the rule. It is argued that this arises from the sense we have that we are guided by the rule. The rule cannot tell us what to do next because that would entail a view of understanding as an interpretation. We would be returned to the regress. The rule is being confused with the expression of the rule, since any expression of the rule is open to interpretation. Such a crossed view creates a view of rule following comparable to that described below:

Thus you were inclined to use such expressions as: The steps are really already taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought.” And it seemed as if they were in some unique way predetermined, anticipated – as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality.[xxxii]

At PI 218, Wittgenstein asks: ‘Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule.’[xxxiii] Again Wittgenstein appears to be commenting on our sense that the steps are already taken and arguing the difference between being causally determined and logically determined. His claim is that such a description, as given above by the rails, is only symbolic, and therefore can be seen to be providing a criticism of platonic realism. In Zettel he pointed out: ‘The comparison is wrong. There is no such thing here as, so to say, a wheel that he is to catch hold of, the right machine, which, once chosen, will carry him on automatically.’[xxxiv]

He points out ‘When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.’[xxxv] So, even though there are no platonic rails, we still obey rules, we just do so blindly. The rails fail because they are another example of an unnecessary link between the understanding of a rule and its use; if I were in the position to choose then there would be nothing to determine the choice but if I were following rails already laid out then how can we understand making mistakes etc. Our mind does not somehow fix upon invisible rails in order to determine how we shall obey a rule; we may be logically determined to follow these ‘rails’ but not causally determined.

At PI 195, Wittgenstein wrote:

“But I don’t mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the future use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is in some sense present.” – But of course it is, ‘in some sense’! Really the only thing wrong with what you say is the expression “in a queer way”. The rest is all right…[xxxvi]

The upshot of this is that rule following only seems to be ‘queer’ when we confuse its role, and think that it is a causal one as opposed to a logical one. He states a couple of passages later:

But there is nothing astonishing, nothing queer, about what happens. It becomes queer when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn’t present.[xxxvii]

He comments that such symbolical expressions are really a ‘mythological description of the use of a rule’[xxxviii] and this can be seen to be why we have difficulty with the notion of a rule – on consideration of our own behaviour we are led to a view of rule-following which is either ‘mythological’ or incoherent. This view would seem to agree with Wittgenstein’s overall philosophical concerns. Throughout his changing philosophy, Wittgenstein held on to the belief that philosophical puzzles arise from a misleading view of language. He thought that should we clarify the workings of language, such puzzles would no longer be an issue. He suggested that these muddles actually hinder rather than help us and so he sought to free himself from such misleading preconceptions. He comments: ‘When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilised men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.’[xxxix] This could be seen to be what has happened here.

It was a part of this view that led to his insistence that philosophy should not advocate theories of any kind, but should only aim to clarify muddles, leaving everything as it is. Unlike Kripkenstein it seems unlikely that he is therefore advocating a theory in this particular discussion, although it must be considered that it is not impossible. His view can be summarised as follows:

It is not the business of philosophy to advance any kind of theory or to build any system of ideas or propositions…. Philosophy is not the search for truth and knowledge or a struggle against ignorance and error. It is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. Our search is for a cure for mental cramp.[xl]

This would also serve to explain why Wittgenstein’s writing style is unusually obscure, since he is trying not to propose a ‘philosophical system or series of doctrines.’[xli] This has led some philosophers, notably JohnMcDowell, to suggest that Wittgenstein was a Quietist.

Baker and Hacker have also pointed out that Wittgenstein specifically argued against scepticism:

Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obvious nonsense if it tries to doubt where no question can be asked.
For doubt can only exist where a question exists; a question can only exist where an answer exists, and this can only exist where something can be said.[xlii]

They comment: ‘It would be very surprising to discover that someone who throughout his life found philosophical scepticism nonsensical… should actually make a sceptical problem the pivotal point of his work,’[xliii] and therefore find it unlikely that Wittgenstein is proposing a sceptical paradox. Instead it is their opinion that Wittgenstein is maintaining an attack against a philosophical view of the nature of language, and to deny it is to ‘deny a nonsensical metaphysical theory.’[xliv]

McDowell maintains that it is Wittgenstein’s intention to show that since no such fact can be given means that we have reached the limit of explanation, rather than a sceptical paradox. He suggests that the sections on rule-following in the PI are arguing against a mythological view of rule following, and it is exactly that argument that Kripke has misconstrued: ‘The mythology is wrung from us, in our need to avoid the paradox of the first paragraph, only because we fall into the misunderstanding; the attack on the mythology is not support for the paradox, but rather constitutes, in conjunction with the fact that the paradox is intolerable, an argument against the misunderstanding.’[xlv] He considers Wittgenstein’s comment:

“How am I able to obey a rule?” - if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.
If I have exhausted the justification I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”[xlvi]

If no justification can be given then all that has happened is that we have reached the limits of explanation, the ‘bedrock’ beyond which no further explanation can be given. It is therefore strongly anti-reductionist since no explanations of meaning can be given with reference to anything else. We just have to remember how we use our words in ordinary life: ‘To use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right'[xlvii] and as such we just mean what we take ourselves to mean. Souren Teghrarian points out that although he is saying that justifications come to an end at the bedrock he ‘is not saying that that there is no such thing as justification, but only that there is an end to the process of justification.’[xlviii] Wittgenstein made a similar point in RFM:

The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to recognise the ground that lies before us as the ground.
For the ground keeps on giving us the illusory image of a greater depth, and when we seek to reach this, we keep on finding ourselves on the old level.
Our disease is one of wanting to explain.[xlix]

He thought it is the philosophical urge to explain that can leads us into ‘mythological’ explanations. He commented: ‘there is an overwhelming temptation to say something more, when everything has already been described.’[l]

So, in what sense can we take rule following to have already been explained or described? We have already seen that ‘there is a way of following a rule which is not an interpretation’[li] but what is that way if it is not a mental or behavioural state? In RFM he commented:

I have a definite concept of the rule. I know what I have to do in any particular case. I know, that is I am in no doubt: it is obvious to me. I say “Of course”. I can give no reason.[lii]

This would seem to indicate that Wittgenstein views rule following as something which cannot be explained in the sense that Kripkenstein’s sceptic would like. However, he does seem to offer an alternative. His response appears to be that the concept of rule following, in general, is because we have the customs we do:

The application of the concept ‘following a rule’ presupposes a custom. Hence it would be nonsense to say: just once in the history of the world someone followed a rule (or a signpost; played a game, uttered a sentence, or understood one; and so on).[liii]

So, as has previously been mentioned, Wittgenstein views rule following to be the result of a custom. In comparison the communitarian views espoused by Kripkenstein, although similar, seem to be a far stronger claim. Wittgenstein appears to condone the idea that rule following is a practice established by teaching and custom, but that does not entail that rule following is only justified with appeal to community practice. Wittgenstein does make several comments that could indicate he is suggesting an appeal to the community, however:

The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason.[liv]

Could there be only one human being that calculated? Could there be only one that followed a rule?
Are these questions like, say, this one: “Can one man alone engage in commerce?”[lv]

Although these comments could lead to the conclusion Wittgenstein was suggesting an appeal to the community, a different interpretation also seems to present itself in reading the text. Wittgenstein commented: ‘Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were ever obeyed? The concept ‘order’ would have lost its purpose.’[lvi] This suggests that rules are not justified by appeal to the community, in his opinion, but instead that without community agreement there could be no such thing as rule following. Without communal assent we cannot judge whether someone has followed a rule or not; we would be playing a completely different game. Wittgenstein’s interlocutor questions whether it is human agreement which decides the truth or falsity of statements. Wittgenstein replied: ‘It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.’[lvii] A ‘form of life’ can be summarised as: ‘the underlying consensus of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, assumptions, practices, traditions, and natural propensities which humans, as social beings, share with one another, and which is therefore presupposed in the language they use.[lviii]

Wittgenstein comments: ‘Following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game.’

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Wittgenstein commented: ‘Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were ever obeyed? The concept ‘order’ would have lost its purpose.’[lvi] This suggests that rules are not justified by appeal to the community, in his opinion, but instead that without community agreement there could be no such thing as rule following. Without communal assent we cannot judge whether someone has followed a rule or not; we would be playing a completely different game
This is a complete misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's comment: The point has nothing to do with "community agreement" as Tegthrarin suggests. Rather,the point is the simple one that if no orders were ever obeyed the practice of giving orders would be functionless and would soon disappear. Even if the community "agreed" in what an order is and even that they should exist, the practice would still be pointless. Indeed all sorts of things become pointless and vanish through lack of use or interest, regardless of "community interest" or not. One can find all sorts of people who agree that radio was better entertainment than television: but the fact is that, "agreement" aside, old-style radio no longer has any use. The same is true of Wittgenstein's practice of orders that no one follows.
Hence Tegharian's comment about 'community agreement' completely misses the point of Wittgenstein's comment.

Alonzo Milton on September 21, 2003 05:11 AM