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Outline and discuss the main differences between formal and cognitive approaches to linguistic meaning. Which type of approach do you find most persuasive?

Since any discussion of linguistic meaning is traditionally the realm of semantics, in order to discuss the differences between formal and cognitive approaches to linguistic meaning, we must consider formal semantics and then compare its approach with that of cognitive semantics.

John Saeed defines formal semantics as follows: ‘Although any approach might be formalised, this label is usually used for a family of denotational theories which use logic in semantics analysis.’[1] Saeed compares denotational with representational approaches; where in representational approaches ‘the search for meaning is the search for mental representations’[2] and in denotational approaches meaning is directly related to the world, in this case ‘the search for meaning… is the search for how the symbols of language relate to reality.’[3] So, a logical, denotational approach is a form of formal semantics and is usually based on truth-conditional analysis. One approach of this nature would be the Millian view of language, which is a traditional correspondence theory of meaning insofar as the meaning of a word is given by its reference to the world. The meaning of a sentence is analysed by its truth-conditions which are given by the world. Although simple, and in some respects intuitive, such an approach has severe difficulties including the fact that it was unable to explain the meaning given by words which do not have a referent in reality, for example fictional characters. As a way of dealing with such problems Frege introduced the notion of sense, claiming that a word has both reference and sense. Such approaches have been subjected to a lot of modification.

Formal approaches are generally associated with the notion that cognition is separate from linguistic ability insofar as language forms an autonomous module, which is separated from, or independent of, other abilities. The language module is often broken down into further parts, where syntax is separated from semantics and so on. On this approach ‘it is good practice to investigate linguistic principles without reference to other mental faculties; and internally, to investigate, say, syntactic principles without reference to semantic content.’[4]

Another form of formal approach is one which has a representational view of cognition, modular in nature, in which representations are given meaning by their reference to the world. This is a position George Lakoff, a cognitive semanticist, in his paper ‘Cognitive Semantics’, refers to as objectivist cognition and he summarises its central claim as follows:

Rational thought is the algorithmic manipulation of arbitrary abstract symbols that are meaningless in themselves but get their meaning by being associated with things in the world.

In objectivist cognition, the symbols and algorithmic operations of symbol-manipulation are seen as constituting a language of thought. The symbols function as internal representations of external reality and the rules that manipulate the symbols do not make use of what the symbols mean.[5]

This approach can be considered to be formal, although representational in nature, because it uses a correspondence theory of truth-conditional analysis i.e. the meaning of a representation is given by the formal analysis of its components, which are given by association with the world, and the meaning of a word is given in relation to this representation. This approach became popular with the cognitive science community and is best exemplified by Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis which postulates a series of abstract representations which have language-like combinatorial semantics.

In comparison to the modular nature of formal approaches, cognitive approaches to linguistic meaning deny that there is a ‘separation of linguistic knowledge from general thinking or cognition’[6] and therefore assert that language is an integrated part of cognition. This view entails that there is no formal division of cognitive abilities, and also no formal division between different areas of linguistic study. The major claim is that concepts are formed by the structured nature of our experience, combined with an innate capacity to imaginatively project from this to abstract conceptual structures. Furthermore rational thought can be considered to be the application of general cognitive processes, since a modular theory is not presumed.

Lakoff states that his theory of experientialist cognition posits:

- Concepts of two sorts that are meaningful
1. Basic-level concepts
2. Image-schemas (e.g., containers, paths, links, part-whole schemas, force-dynamic schemas, etc.). These have a nonfinitary internal structure.
- Imaginative processes for forming abstract cognitive models from these: Schematisation, Metaphor, Metonymy and Categorisation.
- Basic cognitive processes such as focussing, scanning, superimposition, figure-ground shifting, vantage-point shifting, etc.
- Mental spaces.[7]

So, what are the main differences between these two approaches? For the purpose of this comparison, I shall contrast experientialist cognition, which is held by cognitive approaches to linguistic meaning, with objectivist cognition, which is held by the majority of formal approaches to linguistic meaning.

Lakoff suggests that the formal approaches, so far discussed, involve a view of semantics that is based on objectivist metaphysics. Objectivist metaphysics is a strong form of realism and is more commonly known as ‘metaphysical realism’. In order to fully discuss the difference between formal and cognitive approaches, we must first consider what Lakoff believes is wrong with objectivist metaphysics.

Lakoff suggests that the basic tenets of this view are given by four doctrines:

Doctrine 1: The world consists of entities with fixed properties and relations holding among them at any instant. This structure is mind-free, that is, independent of the understanding of any beings.
Doctrine 2: The entities in the world are divided up naturally into categories called natural kinds. All natural kinds are sets defined by the essential properties shared by their members.
Doctrine 3: All properties are either complex or primitive; complex properties are logical combinations of primitive properties.
Doctrine 4: There are rational relations that hold objectively among the entities and categories in the world. For example if an entity x is in category A and if A is in category B, then x is in B.[8]

These doctrines are interrelated, since Putnam’s analysis of natural kind terms leads from essentialism, which in turn is based on model logic; rational relations are a consequence of logical combinations of categories etc. Lakoff suggests that if this view is denied it has some devastating consequences for objectivist cognition. There are several reasons for wanting to reject this view, among which are:

§ The concept of an objective mind-free reality is not, in itself conceivable, since we impose our own structure upon the world. This can be argued from the grouping of categories or concepts, and from the potential informativeness of identity statements. This is not to suggest that it does not exist, only that we cannot access it. This has been argued in depth by Thomas Nagel in his book The View From Nowhere.
§ In addition, such a view is based on set theory, which has itself been shown to have several problems including Russell’s paradox of a set containing all sets. Such a set cannot contain itself – which is paradoxical.
§ The status of natural kinds has been heavily debated, and has now been reduced to scientific essentialism.
§ The nature of properties which combine to form concepts or categories has been brought into question – as shall be discussed later.

Lakoff suggests a further three doctrines which lead from objectivist metaphysics, which can be seen to be the foundations of formal approaches to linguistic meaning:

Doctrine 5. The doctrine of truth conditional meaning: Meaning is based on reference and truth.
Doctrine 6. The “correspondence theory” of truth: Truth consists in the correspondence between symbols and states of affairs in the world.
Doctrine 7. The doctrine of objective reference: There is an “objectively correct” way to associate symbols with things in the world.[9]

Truth is defined as correspondence to the world; meaning is given by objective reference to the world, which can be analysed in terms of truth-conditions. So, in terms of representations, they are meaningful>[10] In this sense, meaning is given as reference to an objective reality as defined by doctrines 1-4. If the world is not structured according to doctrines 1-4 then doctrines 5-7 are not supported and therefore objectivists run into difficulty explaining meaning since meaning is fixed by fixing the reference.

There are a further two doctrines which lead from this, about which Lakoff raises issue.

Doctrine 8: Conceptual categories are designated by sets characterised by necessary and sufficient conditions on the properties of their members.[11]
Doctrine 9: A complex concept is DEFINED by a collection of necessary and sufficient conditions on less complex (and, ultimately, primitive) concepts.[12]

Conceptual categories are categories which are ‘given’ to us by the objectivist view of reality, and include natural kind terms. It is argued that something fits into one category as opposed to another according to a set of necessary and sufficient features. This has led to feature analysis, known as componential analysis, in formal linguistics. One famous example is the linguistic category BATCHELOR which can be analysed into four components [+HUMAN] [+MALE] [+ADULT] [-MARRIED]. It is considered that if any of these features are changed then the meaning will be changed. In addition, as doctrine 9 specifies, a concept is defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on primitive concepts. These primitive concepts are fundamental to objectivist metaphysics as can be seen by doctrine 3. This view is appealing because it offers the potential of a structured analysis of word meaning based on component parts. It can explain concept learning with recourse to assembling features, and can be used to explain categorisation.

It has been argued that this analysis of concepts is incorrect. It suffers from several problems including: the difficulty of defining concepts according to necessary and sufficient feature (most famously Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘game’), the problems raised by Kripke and Putnam of ignorance and error, the problems of conceptual fuzziness, and the problem of typicality effects. Cognitive semanticists instead posit ‘prototypes’ which they argue solve all of these problems, without having to resort to necessary and sufficient features.

In comparison to objectivist views of cognition stands George Lakoff’s view of experientialist cognition. His view is based on a cognitive semantic approach and is therefore diametrically opposed to many of the approaches of formal linguistics. Lakoff suggests that the objectivist picture ignores the role of human physicality, or being in the world, for the development of concepts. He calls it experientialist cognition because it considers: ‘that aspect of experience that we have simply by virtue of being human and living on earth in a human society.’[13] He also comments that research suggests the human imaginative capacity plays a major role in the determining of concepts, beyond that given by external reality. He argues:

What is needed to replace the objectivist view of meaning is an irreducibly cognitive semantics, one that accounts for what meaning is to human beings, rather than trying to replace humanly meaningful.[14]

Lakoff argues that such a cognitive semantics would avoid the metaphysical objectivism of formal theories, by placing central the role of our sensory-motor and social experience to explaining meaning. The theory is representational, although not in the sense of formal representational theories, because meaning is given in terms of human cognition. The difference is that the meaning of human cognition is not given in reference to an external, mind-free, reality. He states that the central claim of this experientialist cognition is that our concepts are formed by the structured nature of our experience, combined with an innate capacity to imaginatively project from this to abstract conceptual structures. Furthermore rational thought can be considered to be the application of general cognitive processes, since a modular theory is not presumed.

Therefore, to summarise the differences between the two approaches, objectivist cognition is based on a modular view of the mind, unlike the experientialist view. The experientialist views cognition as fundamental to our being-in-the-world, rather than disembodied. Objectivist views, as we saw, use a correspondence theory of meaning, where meaning is given in terms of reference to the world, in comparison experientialists view meaning as being formed by the structured nature of our experience, combined with an innate capacity to imaginatively project to abstract conceptual structures. In addition, objectivist views see cognition as being the formal manipulation of symbols (especially in the Language of Thought Hypothesis), whereas experientialists appeal to cognitive models in conceptual spaces.

Although the objectivist approach is appealing as an approach in metaphysics and cognition, it is suggested that the experientialist approach better fits the data. There are difficulties with the objectivist metaphysics and also difficulty with analysis based on componential analysis. In addition, since formal accounts separate cognition into distinct modules, non-linguistic evidence was ignored. In comparison, approaches in cognitive semantics have specifically looked for psychological and biological data in order to support their approach. It appears to so far be working as a thesis, but still has many years of development left before it can fully-supplant formal approach.

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[1] Saeed, p268
[2] Saeed, p268
[3] Saeed, p269
[4] Saeed, p300
[5] Eco, p119
[6] Saeed, p299
[7] Eco, p121
[8] Eco, p123-4
[9] Eco, p125
[10] Eco, p125
[11] Eco, p130
[12] Eco, p136
[13] Eco, p120
[14] Eco, p120

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Sheila on March 8, 2003 05:50 AM

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Sheila on March 8, 2003 05:50 AM

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Patrick Undi on November 7, 2003 08:35 PM